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Abstrat. We introdue and study a proess algebra able to model the
systems omposed of proesses (agents) whih may migrate within a dis-
tributed environment omprising a number of distint loations. Two
proesses may ommuniate if they are present in the same loation and,
in addition, they have appropriate aess permissions to ommuniate
over a hannel. Aess permissions are dynami, and proesses an a-
quire new aess permissions or lose some existing permissions while
migrating from one loation to another. Timing onstraints oordinate
and ontrol the ommuniation between proesses and migration be-
tween loations. Then we ompletely haraterise those situations when
a proess is always guaranteed to possess safe aess permissions. The
onsequenes of suh a result are twofold. First, we are able to validate
systems where one does not need to hek (at least partially) aess per-
missions as they are guaranteed not to be violated, improving eieny
of implementation. Seond, one an design systems in whih proesses
are not bloked (deadloked) beause of the lak of dynamially hanging
aess permissions.
Keywords: distributed systems, mobile agents, ommuniation, aess
permissions, operational semantis, speiation, stati analysis
1 Introdution
The inreasing omplexity of mobile appliations in whih the timing aspets are
important to the system operation means that the need for their eetive analysis
and veriation is beoming ritial. In this paper we explore formal modelling
of mobile systems where one an also speify time-related aspets of migrat-
ing proesses and, ruially, seurity aspets expressed by aess permissions
to ommuniation hannels. Building on our previous work on TiMo presented
at FASE'08 [8℄, we introdue PerTiMo (Permissions, Timers and Mobility)
whih is a proess algebra supporting proess migration (strong mobility), loal
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interproess ommuniation over shared hannels ontrolled by aess permis-
sions that proesses must possess, and timers (driven by loal loks) ontrolling
the exeution of ations. An important feature of the proposed model is that a-
ess permissions are dynami. More preisely, proesses an aquire new aess
permissions, or lose some of their urrent aess permissions while moving from
one loation to another, modelling a key seurity related feature. Proesses are
equipped with input and output apabilities whih are ative up to pre-dened
time deadlines and, if these ommuniations are not taken, alternative ontinu-
ations for the proess behaviour are followed. Another timing onstraint allows
one to speify the latest time for moving a proess from one loation to another.
These two kinds of timing onstraints help in the ontrol and oordination of
migration and ommuniation in distributed systems. We provide the syntax
and operational semantis of PerTiMo whih is a disrete time semantis in-
orporating maximally parallel exeutions of ations using loal loks.
To introdue the basi omponents of PerTiMo, we use a TravelShop run-
ning example in whih a lient proess attempts to pay as little as possible for
a tiket to a pre-dened destination. The senario involves ve loations and six
proesses. The role of eah of the loations is as follows: (i) home is a loation
where the lient proess starts and ends its journey; (ii) travelshop is a main
loation of the servie whih is initially visible to the lient; (iii) standard and
special are two internal loations of the servie where lients an nd out about
the tiket pries; and (iv) bank is a loation where the payment is made. The
role of eah of the proesses is as follows:
 client is a proess whih initially resides in the home loation, and is deter-
mined to pay for a ight after omparing two oers (standard and speial)
provided by the travel shop. Upon entering the travel shop, client reeives
the loation of the standard oer and, after moving there and obtaining this
oer, the lient is given the loation where a speial oer an be obtained.
After that client moves to the bank and pays for the heaper of the two
oers, and then returns bak to home .
 agent rst informs client where to look for the standard oer and then moves
to bank in order to ollet the money from the till. After that agent returns
bak to travelshop.
 flightinfo ommuniates the standard oer to lients as well as the loation
of the speial oer.
 saleinfo ommuniates the speial oer to lients together with the loation
of the bank. saleinfo an also aept an update by the travel shop of the
speial oer.
 update initially resides at the travelshop loation and then migrates to special
in order to update the speial oer.
 till resides at the bank loation and an either reeive e-money paid in by
lients, or transfer the e-money aumulated so far to agent .
PerTiMo uses timers in order to impose deadlines on the exeution of om-
muniations and migrations. Moreover, proesses need to possess appropriate
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a: initial onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
130
client
100
agent
60
update
110
special
flightinfo
90
bank
saleinfo
10
till
b: intermediate onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
130
client
100
agent update
110
special
flightinfo
60
bank
saleinfo
10
till
: nal onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
70
client
170
agent
update
110
special
flightinfo
60
bank
saleinfo
0
till
Fig. 1. Three snapshots of the evolution of the running example. In the initial ongu-
ration we indiated the intended migration paths of three proesses. The intermediate
onguration illustrates the phase of the evolution after some initial movements of
the lient and after updating the seond ight prie. The nal onguration shows the
state of the system after a suessful payment has been made; the total sum of e-money
owned by the lient (70 ), agent (170 ) and till (0 ) is exatly the same as the sum at
the beginning of the evolution when the lient has 130 , agent 100 and till 10 . Note
that the hannels used by proesses to ommuniate information are not shown.
aess permissions in order to send and reeive information. Figure 1 portrays
three possible stages of the evolution of the TravelShop system.
Eah loation has its loal lok whih determines the timing of ations exe-
uted at that loation. The timeout of a migration ation indiates the network
time limit for that ation (similar to TTL in TCP/IP).
We use x to denote a nite tuple (x1, . . . , xk) whenever it does not lead
to a onfusion, and if X is a tuple of sets (X1, . . . , Xk) then
∏
X denotes
X1 × . . .×Xk. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basi onepts of
proess algebras [14℄. All proofs our results an be found in [9℄.
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2 Syntax and semantis of PerTiMo
Timing onstraints for migration allow one to speify what is the time window for
a proess to move from one loation to another. E.g., a timer (suh as ∆5 ) of a
migration ation go∆5home indiates that the proess will move to home within
5 time units. It is also possible to onstrain the waiting for a ommuniation
on a hannel; if a ommuniation ation does not happen before a deadline, the
waiting proess gives up and swithes its operation to an alternative. E.g., a
timer (suh as ∆4 ) of an output ation a∆4 ! 〈13 〉 makes the hannel available
for ommuniation only for the period of 4 time units. We assume suitable data
sets inluding a set Loc of loations and a set Chan of ommuniation hannels.
We use a set Id of proess identiers, and eah id ∈ Id has arity mid .
To ommuniate over a hannel at a given network loation, the sender pro-
ess should have a `put' aess permission, and the reeiving proess a `get'
aess permission. The set Γ of aess permissions of a proess is a subset of
AccPerm
df
= {put, get} × Chan × Loc. We use the notation get〈a@l〉 to denote
an aess permission (get, a, l) ∈ AccPerm, and put〈a@l〉 to denote (put, a, l) ∈
AccPerm. Intuitively, we work with aess permissions to sokets where l repre-
sents an IP address and a represents a ommuniation port.
We allow aess permissions of a proess to hange while moving from one
loation to another. To model this, we use the following four basi aess per-
mission modiation operations: put+
a@l
, get+
a@l
, put−
a@l
and get−
a@l
, where l is a
loation and a is a ommuniation hannel. The rst two (put+
a@l
and get+
a@l
)
add aess permissions, while the latter two (put−
a@l
and get−
a@l
) remove aess
permissions. For instane, put+
a@l
(Γ ) = Γ ∪ {put〈a@l〉}. Then an aess permis-
sion modiation operation is either the identity on AccPerm, or a omposition
of some basi aess permission modiation operations suh that if put+
a@l
is
used in the omposition then put−
a@l
is not used (giving and at the same time
removing an aess permission does not make sense). For a given network, we
then speify what are the hanges to the aess permission sets of proesses mi-
grating from one loation to another. This is speied as a mapping apm whih,
for eah pair (l, l′) of loations, returns a permission modiation operation; if a
proess with the urrent aess permissions Γ moves from loation l to loation
l′, its new set of aess permissions beomes apm(l, l′)(Γ ).
The syntax of PerTiMo is given in Table 1, where P are proesses, PP
proesses with (aess) permissions, and N networks. Moreover, for eah id ∈ Id ,
there is a unique proess denition of the form:
id(u1, . . . , umid : X
id
1 , . . . , X
id
mid
)
df
= Pid , (1)
where the ui's are distint variables playing the role of parameters, and the
X id
i
's are data sets. Proesses of the form stop and id(v) are alled primitive.
In Table 1, it is assumed that:
 a ∈ Chan is a hannel, and t ∈ N ∪ {∞} is a time deadline;
 eah vi is an expression built from values, variables and allowed operations;
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Proesses P ::= a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else P ′ p (output)
a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ p (input)
go∆t l then P p (move)
P |P ′ p (parallel)
stop p (termination)
id(v) p (reursion)
sP (stalling)
Typed Proesses PP ::= P : Γ p PP |PP ′
Networks N ::= l [[PP ]] p N |N ′
Shorthand notation:
a ! 〈v〉 → P will be used to denote a∆∞ ! 〈v〉 then P else stop
a ? (u:X) → P will be used to denote a∆∞ ? (u:X) then P else stop .
Table 1. PerTiMo syntax. The length of u is the same as that of X, and the length
of v in id(v) is mid .
 eah ui is a variable, and eah Xi is a data set;
 l is a loation or a variable, and Γ a set of ation permissions; and
 s is a speial symbol used to express that a proess is temporarily stalled.
The only variable binding onstrut is a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ whih binds
the variables u within P (but not within P ′). We use fv(P ) to denote the free
variables of a proess P (and similarly for proesses with aess permissions
and networks). For a proess denition as in (1), we assume that fv (Pid ) ⊆
{u1, . . . , umid} and so the free variables of Pid are parameter bound. Proesses
are dened up to the alpha-onversion, and {v/u, . . .}P is obtained from P by
replaing all free ourrenes of a variable u by v, possibly after alpha-onverting
P in order to avoid lashes. Moreover, if v and u are tuples of the same length
then {v/u}P = {v1/u1, v2/u2, . . . , vk/uk}P .
A network N is well-formed if the following hold:
 there are no free variables in N ;
 there are no ourrenes of the speial symbol s in N ; and
 assuming that id is as in the reursive equation (1), for every id(v) ourring
in N or on the right hand side of any reursive equation, the expression vi is
of type orresponding toX id
i
(where we use the standard rules of determining
the type of an expression).
Intuitively, a proess a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else P ′ attempts to send a tuple of
values v over the hannel a for t time units. If suessful, it then ontinues
as proess P ; otherwise it ontinues as the alternative proess P ′. Similarly,
a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ is a proess that attempts for t time units to input
a tuple of values from X and substitute them for the variables u. Mobility is
implemented by proesses go∆t l then P whih moves from the urrent loation
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TravelShop
df
=
home [[ client(130 ) : ∅ ]] |
travelshop [[ agent(100 ) : {put〈flight@travelshop〉} | update(60 ) : ∅ ]] |
standard [[ flightinfo(110 , special ) : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard〉} ]] |
special [[ saleinfo(90 , bank) : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[ till(10 ) : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
apm(home, travelshop)
df
= get+flight@travelshop
apm(travelshop , standard )
df
= get+info@standard
apm(travelshop , special )
df
= put+info@special
apm(standard , special )
df
= get+info@special ◦ get
−
info@standard
apm(special , bank)
df
= put+pay@bank ◦ get
−
info@special ◦ get
−
pay@bank
apm(travelshop , bank)
df
= get+pay@bank
client(init:eMoney)
df
=
go
∆5 travelshop → flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) →
go
∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) →
go
∆3 specialoffer → info ? (p2 :eMoney , paying :Loc) →
go∆6 paying → pay ! 〈min{p1 , p2}〉 →
go∆4 home → client(init −min{p1 , p2})
agent(balance:eMoney)
df
=
flight ! 〈standard〉 → go∆10 bank →
pay ? (profit :eMoney) → go∆12 travelshop →
agent(balance + profit)
update(saleprice :eMoney)
df
=
go
∆0 special → info ! 〈saleprice〉 → stop
flightinfo(price : eMoney ,next : Loc)
df
=
info ! 〈price,next〉 → flightinfo(price, next)
saleinfo(price : eMoney ,next : Loc)
df
=
info∆10 ? (newprice:eMoney)
then saleinfo(newprice ,next)
else info ! 〈price ,next〉 → saleinfo(price,next)
till(cash :eMoney)
df
=
pay∆1 ? (newpayment :eMoney)
then till(cash + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈cash〉 then till(0 ) else till(cash)
Table 2. PerTiMo network modelling the running example together with the relevant
aess permission modiation operations (those omitted are all equal to the identity
mapping on AccPerm).
to the loation given by l within t time units. Note that sine l an be a variable,
and so its value is assigned dynamially through ommuniation with other pro-
esses, migration ations support a exible sheme for movement of proesses
from one loation to another.
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A network l [[P : Γ ]] speies a proess P with the aess permissions Γ
running at a loation l. Finally, proess expressions of the form sP represent
a purely tehnial devie whih is used in our formalisation of strutural op-
erational semantis of PerTiMo; intuitively, it speies a proess P whih is
temporarily stalled and so annot exeute any ation.
One might wonder why a proess an delay migration to another loation.
The point is that by allowing this we an model in a simple way the non-
determinism in the movement of proesses whih is, in general, outside the
ontrol of a system designer. Thus the timer in this ase indiates the upper
bound on the migration time.
The speiation of the running example whih aptures the essential fea-
tures of the senario desribed in the introdution is given in Table 2. We
assume that Loc = {home, travelshop, standard , special , bank} and Chan =
{info,flight , pay}. Table 2 shows the proess network TravelShop modelling the
senario, as well as the aess permission modiation operations whih are ap-
plied to the proess expressions when they move around the ve nodes of the
network.
The rst omponent of the operational semantis of PerTiMo is the stru-
tural equivalene ≡ on networks, similar to that used in [4℄. It is the smallest
ongruene suh that the equalities (Eq1Eq4) in Table 3 hold. Its role is to
rearrange a network in order to apply the ation rules whih are also given in
Table 3. Using (Eq1Eq4) one an always transform a given network N into a
nite parallel omposition of networks of the form:
l1 [[P1:Γ1 ]] | . . . | ln [[Pn:Γn ]] (2)
suh that no proess Pi has the parallel omposition operator at its topmost
level. Eah sub-network li [[Pi:Γi ]] is alled a omponent of N , the set of all
omponents is denoted by comp(N), and the parallel omposition (2) is alled
a omponent deomposition of the network N . Note that these notions are well-
dened sine omponent deomposition is unique up to the permutation of the
omponents (see Remark 1 below).
Table 3 introdues two kinds of ation rules, N
λ
−→ N ′ and N
√
l−→ N ′. The
former is an exeution of an ation λ, and the latter a time step in loation l.
In the rule (Time), N 6→l means that no l-ation λ (i.e., an ation of the form
id@l or l ⊲ l′ or @l or a〈v〉@l) an be applied to N . Moreover, φl(N) is obtained
by taking the omponent deomposition of N and simultaneously replaing all
omponents of the form l [[ a∆tω then P else Q : Γ ]]  where ω stands for ! 〈v〉
or ? (u:X)  by l [[Q : Γ ]] if t = 0, and otherwise by l [[ a∆t−1ω then P else Q :
Γ ]]. After that ourrenes of the speial symbol s in N are erased.
So far we dened loated exeutions of ations. An entire omputational step
is aptured by a derivation N
Λ
=⇒ N ′, where Λ = {λ1, . . . , λn} is a nite multiset
of l-ations for some loation l suh that
N
λ1−→ · · ·
λn−→
√
l−→ N ′ .
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(Eq1) N |N ′ ≡ N ′ |N
(Eq2) (N |N ′) |N ′′ ≡ N | (N ′ |N ′′)
(Eq3) l [[PP |PP ′ ]] ≡ l [[PP ]] | l [[PP ′ ]]
(Eq4) l [[P |Q : Γ ]] ≡ l [[P : Γ |Q : Γ ]]
(Call) l [[ id(v) : Γ ]]
id@l
−→ l [[s {v/u}Pid : Γ ]]
(Move) l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]]
l⊲l
′
−→ l′ [[sP : apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ]]
(Wait)
t > 0
l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] @l−→ l [[s go∆t−1 l′ then P : Γ ]]
(Com)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ′ v ∈
∏
X
l [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else Q : Γ | a∆t
′
? (u:X) then P ′ else Q′ : Γ ′ ]]
a〈v〉@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l [[sP : Γ | s {v/u}P ′ : Γ ′ ]]
(Par)
N
λ
−→ N ′
N |N ′′
λ
−→ N ′ |N ′′
(Equiv)
N ≡ N ′ N ′
λ
−→ N ′′ N ′′ ≡ N ′′′
N
λ
−→ N ′′′
(Time)
N 6−→l
N
√
l−→ φl(N)
Table 3. Four rules of the strutural equivalene (Eq1-Eq4), and seven ation rules
(Call Move Wait Com Par Equiv Time) of the operational semantis.
We also all N ′ diretly reahable from N . In other words, we an apture the
umulative eet of the onurrent exeution of the multiset of ations Λ at
loation l. Intuitively, networks evolution onforms to the loally maximally
parallelism paradigm sine one exeutes in a single loation l as many as possible
onurrent ation before applying a loal time move whih signies the passage
of a unit of time at loation l.
The two results below ensure that derivations are well dened. First, one
annot exeute an unbounded sequene of ation moves without time progress.
Proposition 1. If N is a network and N
λ1−→ · · ·
λk−→ N ′, then k ≤ |comp(N)|.
Seond, if we start with a well-formed network, exeution proeeds through
alternating exeutions of time steps and ontiguous sequenes of loal ations
making up what an be regarded as a maximally onurrent step (note the role
of the speial symbols s). This intuition is reinfored by the following result.
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Proposition 2. Let N be a well-formed network. If N
λ1−→ · · ·
λn−→ N ′, then we
have N
λi1−→ · · ·
λin−→ N ′, for every permutation i1, . . . , in of 1, . . . , n.
It is worth noting that the semantial treatment of PerTiMo itself a on-
tinuation of the idea developed for TiMo  goes beyond interleaving semantis
by introduing an expliit representation of loal maximal parallelism and loal
time progress in the network evolution.
Our last result in this setion is that the rules of Table 3 preserve well-
formedness of networks.
Proposition 3. Networks reahable from a well-formed network are well-formed.
Table 4 illustrates exeution steps based on the senario illustrated in Figure 1
(note that Λ2 represents a parallel exeution of two ations). We indiate only
the main rules used in the derivation of steps. Eah exeution step takes a single
unit of time in the loation at whih it has been exeuted and some timers are
deremented by one (e.g., the timer ∆3 of hannel info in U0 is hanged to ∆2
in U1). Other timers whih have expired ause an immediate migration or the
seletion of the alternative part of a ommuniation ation (see W1 whih is
replaed by W2).
Note that the last network expression derived from TravelShop in Table 4
orresponds to the intermediate onguration shown in Figure 1(b). Note also
that in the representation of Figure 1(b) we show the home loation, even though
it is not present in the last network expression in Table 4. The reason is that
the client proess has moved to travelshop, and there is at present no proess
residing at home . This situation hanges in the nal onguration of Figure 1()
where client has ompleted its migration and ame bak to its initial loation.
Remark 1. Component deomposition is unique sine the rule (Call) treats
reursive denitions as funtion alls whih take a unit of time. Another onse-
quene of suh a treatment is that it is impossible to exeute an innite sequene
of ation steps without exeuting any time steps. Both these properties would
not hold if, instead of an ation rule (Call), we would have a strutural rule of
the form l [[ id(v) : Γ ]] ≡ l [[ {v/u}Pid : Γ ]]. ⊓⊔
3 Safe Aess Permissions
In this setion, we attempt to verify that a migrating proess possesses a suf-
iently rih set of initial aess permissions suh that whenever later on it
attempts to ommuniate over a hannel, it has the required safe aess per-
mission. While doing so, we need to take into aount that migrating proesses
have their aess permission sets modied aording to the mapping apm . If
we sueed, then an important seurity problem related to migration and a-
ess permissions is solved in the sense that never an unauthorised attempt to
ommuniate over a hannel happens during network evolutions.
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TravelShop
Λ1 Λ2 Λ3 Λ4 Λ5=============================================================⇒ 6 × (Call)
home [[ go∆5 travelshop → P0 : ∅ ]] |
travelshop [[Q0 : {put〈flight@travelshop〉} | go
∆0 special → R0 : ∅ ]] |
standard [[U0 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ V0 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W0 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
{home ⊲ travelshop} {travelshop ⊲ special}
=============================================================⇒ 2 × (Move)
travelshop [[flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) → P1:{get〈flight@travelshop〉} |
flight ! 〈standard 〉 → Q1:{put〈flight@travelshop〉} ]] |
standard [[U1 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ info∆9 ? (newprice : eMoney)
→ V1 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special 〉} |
info ! 〈60 〉 → stop : {put〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W1 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
{flight〈standard〉@travelshop} {info〈60〉@special}
=============================================================⇒ 2 × (Com)
travelshop [[P2:{get〈flight@travelshop〉} | Q1:{put〈flight@travelshop〉} ]] |
standard [[U2 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ V2 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} | stop : {put〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W2 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
P0 = flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) → P1
P1 = go
∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) →
go∆3 specialoffer → info ? (p2 :eMoney , paying :Loc) →
go∆6 paying → pay ! 〈min{p1 , p2}〉 →
go
∆4 home → client(130 −min{p1 , p2})
P2 = {standard/standardoffer }P1
Q0 = flight ! 〈standard 〉 → Q1
Q1 = go
∆10 bank →
pay ? (profit :eMoney) → go∆12 travelshop → agent(100 + profit)
R0 = info ! 〈60 〉 → stop
U0 = info
∆3
! 〈110 , special 〉 → flightinfo(110 , special)
U1 = info
∆2
! 〈110 , special 〉 → flightinfo(110 , special)
U2 = flightinfo(110 , special )
V0 = info
∆10
? (newprice :eMoney) then saleinfo(newprice , bank)
else info ! 〈90 , bank〉 → saleinfo(90 , bank)
V1 = info
∆9
? (newprice :eMoney) then saleinfo(newprice , bank)
else info ! 〈90 , bank〉 → saleinfo(90 , bank)
V2 = saleinfo(60 , bank)
W0 = pay
∆1
? (newpayment :eMoney) then till(10 + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
W1 = pay
∆0
? (newpayment :eMoney) then till(10 + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
W2 = pay
∆2
! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
Table 4. Exeution steps for the running example where Λ1 = {client@home},
Λ2 = {agent@travelshop , update@travelshop}, Λ3 = {flightinfo@standard}, Λ4 =
{saleinfo@special} and Λ5 = {till@bank}.
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Throughout this setion we assume that all the data sets are nite (see Re-
mark 2), and that the r.h.s. Pid of eah reursive denition (1) is either a prim-
itive proess (i.e., it is of the form Pid = stop or Pid = id
′(w)) or Pid uses
exatly one appliation of one of the proess operators to some primitive pro-
ess(es). This does not diminish the generality of the proposed method sine we
an always transform all reursive denition into the simple form using addi-
tional proess identiers and reursive denitions without aeting the results
that follow (e.g., P
df
= a→ b→ P is replaed by P
df
= a→ P ′ and P ′ df= b→ P ).
We use judgements of the form Γ ⊢l P to mean that a single-omponent
network l [[P :Γ ]] has safe aess permissions. We assume the open system ontext
whih means that we annot know preisely the migration patterns of a proess
and its ommuniation hannels whih an be aquired through interation with
(unknown) proesses. We plan to deal with lose systems in future, and then
take into aount the time aspets (here we use time for proess oordination).
Given a set of loations Loc together with the apm mapping as well a proess
P and loation l, we want to devise rules for heking that a set of aess per-
missions Γ satises Γ ⊢l P . For instane, if P = go
∆0 l′ then a∆1 ! 〈1〉 → stop
and apm(l, l′) = put−
a@l′
then there is no Γ suh that Γ ⊢l P .
If P does not involve reursive denitions, the task is straightforward. One
just needs to follow the syntati struture of the proess and inrementally
derive Γ . Dealing with reursion is more ompliated, and the solution we pro-
pose onsists in unfolding a reursive proess expression suiently many times
to over all possibilities resulting from migration. For all id ∈ Id , n ≥ 0 and
v ∈
∏
X
id
, the n-th unfolding of id(v) is given by id(v)↑0 df= stop and, for
n > 0, id(v)↑n df= P where P is obtained from {v/u}Pid by replaing eah
subexpression of the form id ′(w) with id ′(w)↑n−1.
The derivation rules for Γ ⊢l P are given in Table 5. The (TMove) rule
onerns a migration from loation l to l′. In order to have l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]]
with safe aess permissions, it is neessary to have l′ [[P : Γ ′ ]] with safe aess
permissions after applying the aess permission modiation to Γ when moving
from l to l′ (note that Γ ′ = apm(l, l′)(Γ )). The rule (TOut) simply requires
that a proess attempting to send a message along a hannel a should possess
the aess permission put〈a@l〉. Similarly, the rule (TIn) requires that a proess
attempting to reeive a message along a hannel a should possess the aess
permission get〈a@l〉; moreover, after reeiving this message it has to have safe
aess permissions with the urrent Γ irrespetive of the values arried by that
message. The onstant H in the rule (TRe) is H
df
= 2 · |Loc| ·
(
1+
∑
id∈Id |X
id
1 | ·
. . .·|X idmid |
)
. The value of H omes from rather tehnial onsiderations needed to
prove results. We an always ensure that H is a well-dened integer and (TIn)
is a nitary rule aording to the following argument.
Remark 2. The judgement system in Table 5 makes important use of data through
the (TOut) rule as a reeived message may arry a loation or hannel name
whih may later be used by other rules. Other kinds of values arried by mes-
sages or present in proess desriptions are ignored. Hene, for the purpose of
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(TSub)
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ Γ ′ ⊢l P
Γ ⊢l P
(TStop) ∅ ⊢l stop
(TMove)
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ P
Γ ⊢l go
∆t l′ then P
(TOut)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ Γ ⊢l P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ⊢l a
∆t
! 〈v〉 then P else Q
(TIn)
get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∀v ∈
∏
X : Γ ⊢l {v/u}P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ⊢l a
∆t
? (u:X) then P else Q
(TRe)
Γ ⊢l id(v)
↑H
Γ ⊢l id(v)
(TPar)
Γ ⊢l P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ∪ Γ ⊢l P |Q
Table 5. Derivation rules for proesses with safe aess permissions.
safe aess permissions, we an replae all non-loation and non-hannel values
by a speial value τ , and all the data types dierent from Loc and Chan by a
singleton type X = {τ}. In this way, all the data sets beome nite. Hene, in
partiular, H is an integer value, and
∏
X in (TIn) is a nite set. ⊓⊔
We have dened what it means to have safe aess permissions in the ase
of a single-omponent network. In the general ase, a network N has safe aess
permissions if eah of its omponents does. These two denitions are onsistent
in the sense that Γ ⊢l P i Γ ⊢l Pi, for every omponent network l [[Pi:Γ ]] of a
single-omponent network l [[P :Γ ]], whih follows from the rule (TPar).
The rst main result states that safe aess permissions is preserved over the
network evolutions dened by the operational semantis.
Theorem 1 (soundness). If a well-formed network N has safe aess permis-
sions, and N ′ is reahable from N , then N ′ has also safe aess permissions.
The seond main result is that in a network with safe aess permissions
there are no attempts to aess a ommuniation hannel without an appropriate
aess permission. This result should be seen as a justiation of our interest in
the notion of safe aess permissions.
Theorem 2 (safety of ommuniations). Let N be a well-formed network
with safe aess permissions.
l [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else Q : Γ ]] ∈ comp(N) implies put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ
l [[ a∆t ? (u:X) then P else Q : Γ ]] ∈ comp(N) implies get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ .
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As an immediate orollary of Theorem 2, for a network with safe aess permis-
sions it is possible to simplify the operational rule for proess ommuniation,
by deleting put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ and get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ′ in rule (Com), and so simplifying
the implementation.
The third main result is that the notion of a network with safe aess per-
missions is omplete in the sense that a network whih does not satisfy this
property an always be plaed in an environment whih reveals its potential to
break safety of interproess ommuniation.
Theorem 3 (ompleteness). Let N = l [[P : Γ ]] be a well-formed network
suh that Γ 6⊢l P . Then there is a well-formed network N
′
with safe aess
permissions as well as a well-formed network N ′′ reahable from N |N ′ suh
that one of the following holds.
 There is a omponent l′ [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P ′ else P ′′ : Γ ′ ]] of N ′′ suh that
put〈a@l′〉 /∈ Γ ′.
 There is a omponent l′ [[ a∆t ? (u:X) then P ′ else P ′′ : Γ ′ ]] of N ′′ suh
that get〈a@l′〉 /∈ Γ ′.
We developed a sound and omplete system for safe of ommuniation and mi-
gration in open networks. Hene we are able to validate systems where one does
not need to hek aess permissions as they are guaranteed not to be violated,
improving implementation. Moreover, the results an be extended allow design-
ing systems in whih proesses are not bloked (deadloked) beause of the lak
of dynamially hanging aess permissions.
4 Conlusions and Related Work
We introdued a distributed proess algebra with proesses able to migrate be-
tween dierent loations and timing onstraints used to ontrol migration and
ommuniation. We use loal loks and loal maximal parallelism of ations.
Proesses have appropriate aess rights to ommuniate; the aess permissions
are dynami and an hange. We have provided an operational semantis of this
model, and investigated the safety of ommuniation and migration in terms of
aess permissions. While we are not aware of any approah ombining all these
aspets regarding mobility with timing onstraints, loal loks, and dynami
aess permission mehanism, our work is related to a large body of literature
using proess algebra in (type-based) seurity. Several systems enompass var-
ious forms of aess ontrol poliies in distributed systems. Among them, the
work on Dpi alulus in [13℄ uses type systems to ontrol statially the aess
to the resoures at the dierent loations of a distributed system. Other related
work on aess ontrol in distributed systems is done in the ontext of the lan-
guage Klaim and its extensions, using type systems that enable the dynami
exhange of aess rights. The paper [7℄ ombines a weak form of information ow
ontrol with typed ryptographi operations to ensure safe stati aess ontrol
and seure network ommuniations. The paper [5℄ use ryptographi operations
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and apability types to get a seure implementation of a typed pi-alulus in or-
der to realise various poliies for aessing the ommuniation hannels. None
of these systems, however, uses together mobility as a rst lass itizen on-
trolled by timing onstraints, dynami aspets of the aess permissions, loal
loks and parallelism. These advantages of the new model an allow to spe-
ify and enfore more diverse and expressive seurity poliies based on aess
permissions. This ould be done in the ontext of designing good programming
language supporting migration in a distributed environment [16℄. On the other
hand, several prototype languages have been designed and experimental imple-
mentations derived from proess aluli like Klaim [4℄ and Aute [15℄. These
prototype languages did not beome a pratial programming language beause
hard questions revolving mainly around issues relating to seurity. PerTiMo
is intended to help bridging the gap between the existing foundational proess
algebras and forthoming realisti languages. It extends some previous attempts
related to tDpi [10℄ and TiMo [8℄. PerTiMo derives from TiMo model (a sim-
plied distributed π-alulus with expliit timeouts) presented in [8℄ by adding
a type system in order to express seurity aspets related to aess permissions.
The basi notion of a timeout in TiMo seemed useful and elegant. PerTiMo
retains this notion and, in addition, it inorporates aess permissions in order
to provide formal foundations for seurity problems relating to the adequate
protetion of aess ontrol information in distributed environment.
As related work, we should mention distributed pi-alulus having an expliit
notion of loation, and dealing with stati resoures aess [12℄ by using a type
system. The paper [3℄ studies a π-alulus extension with a timer onstrut, and
then enrihes the timed πt with loations. Other timed extensions of proess al-
gebras have been studied in [2, 11℄. In [6℄ the authors present a typed π-alulus
with groups and group reation in whih eah name belongs to a group. The
rules for good environments ensure that the names and groups delared in an
environment are distint, and that all the types mentioned in an environment
are good. A onsequene of the typing disipline is the ability to preserve se-
rets, namely preventing ertain ommuniations that would leak serets. The
type system is used for regulating the mobile omputation, allowing to partition
the proesses into disjoint groups in order to speify the behaviour of both om-
muniation and mobility. Somehow related to our dynami aess permissions,
[1℄ presents a parametri alulus for proesses exhanging ode whih may on-
tain free variables to be bound by the reeiver's ode (alled open mobile ode).
Type safety is ensured by a ombination of stati and dynami heks of suh
an exhange of open ode. In this way it is possible to express rebinding of ode
in a distributed environment in a relatively simple way.
Deriving onrete implementation from PerTiMo is part of future work,
and the approah presented in this paper is just a rst step in this diretion. In
our future work we plan to extend the urrent model as follows:
 aess permissions to loations to ontrol migrations of proesses;
 seurity levels for migrating proesses to ontrol aess permissions to han-
nels and loations;
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 relaxing the synhronisation resulting from the maximally parallel semantis,
by retaining maximal parallelism within eah loation, but allowing loations
to proeed with dierent speed;
 rules for well-typing of values in exhanged messages;
 dening and analysing seurity poliies for aess and migration ontrol; and
 introduing and analysing failures in proess migration.
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